Libya’s Unity Plan Has a Partner Problem

Western Libya’s Tripoli-based Government of National Unity says cooperation with Saddam Haftar is “impossible” after allegations linked him to drone attacks on fuel facilities and power stations, the Guardian reports. Haftar, deputy commander of the Libyan National Army and son of Khalifa Haftar, has become an important participant in US-backed plans to unify the country’s institutions. August attacks worsened western Libya’s electricity blackouts and increased pressure on Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah’s government.

The infrastructure damage is more firmly established than responsibility at the top. Libya’s National Oil Corporation said a gasoline tank struck at the Zawiya complex held approximately 4.5 million liters of fuel; the attack caused a fire and the tank’s collapse. The Guardian also reports that the GNU arrested three Libyans and a Spanish citizen on September 5 over an alleged plot. The arrested Libyans allegedly belonged to an LNA formation. Those reported affiliations do not, by themselves, prove that Saddam Haftar ordered the attacks. The supplied account does not include his response, and that omission cannot count as an admission.

Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, Massad Boulos, has proposed merging Libya’s rival governments, with Saddam Haftar taking the presidency and a Dbeibah family member becoming prime minister. Boulos says the plan is not about families or names. Still, allocating offices between prominent families makes personal incentives central to the proposal. An organizational chart can distribute titles more easily than it can establish who will obey whom.

Participation is not a guarantee

Granted, excluding an influential commander can make unification harder. Negotiations often require participants who possess the means to spoil an agreement, and engagement need not certify their innocence or endorse their conduct. A settlement limited to agreeable actors could leave the strongest armed opponents outside its restraints. The GNU also has political incentives to resist terms that diminish its position. Its allegations require scrutiny, not automatic acceptance.

Yet the case for inclusion is not a case for unconditional authority. Negotiators should separate access to talks from eligibility to guarantee infrastructure security. A credible arrangement would need independent examination of the attack evidence, monitoring of commitments to protect fuel and power facilities, and specified consequences for violations. The practical test is whether investigators and monitors could operate when their findings inconvenience either side. Without that protection, verification would depend on permission from the people being verified.

If an independent investigation undermines the alleged link to Haftar, and both camps accept enforceable infrastructure protections, cooperation could regain a factual basis. If evidence establishes command responsibility, the proposed partnership would require substantially stronger restraints or different leadership terms. If either side blocks investigation or monitoring, that refusal would weaken the plan even before another attack. The next meaningful diplomatic achievement is not another photograph of participants together; it is an agreement they cannot privately switch off.